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Abstract: Due to the vital role of security in online communications and this fact that attackers are developing their tools, 
modernizing the security tools is an essential. The efficiency of crypto systems has been proven after years, however one 
may need to communicate stealthy without drawing attention especially in transferring secret data such as keys. Covert 
channels are suitable tools that used to conceal the existence of data besides end communication parties by employing 
principles of steganography. They can make secure communications with obscurity. Working stealthy and providing an 
acceptable throughput are issues in designing covert channels. The DNS protocol properties like its necessity for running 
applications and the availability can provide aforementioned issues decently. In this paper, we proposed a storage covert 
channel which uses DNS protocol as a media for transferring data. The key features include connection establishment, 
adaptability with network environment, implying a lightweight obfuscation method and HMAC to meet confidentiality and 
integrity. Experimental results show the proposed channel statistics are well adapted with normal traffics. The channel has 
an average capacity of 2.65 bytes of data per packet. 
 
1. Introduction 
The term of Secure communication often linked with 
encryption or crypto systems [1,2]. Since power and cost in 
computing resources are becoming more efficient, attacks 
such as brute force increasingly threaten data security. 
However algorithm developers increase encryption key size 
in responses [1], this can impose overhead on processing 
resources. In encrypted communication, the intruder knows 
that there exist a data that flows between two specific 
endpoints. In other words, cryptography does not hide both 
the existence of data and identity of participants in the 
communication. When attackers are aware of 
communications, they can steal and fake the user credentials 
by sniffing, hijacking, cryptanalysis and other possible 
attack [2]. Steganography provides a higher level of security 
by hiding the existence of the message in such a way that 
the intruder cannot understand the difference between 
original and stego carrier [3,4]. 
Covert channels can be used as methods which are 
not only covering the insufficiency of encryption by 
applying principles of steganography but also hide both the 
secret data and method of communication [1]. Covert 
channel is not a new idea and first introduced by Lampson 
in the 1970 [5]. Initially covert channel was a term to 
describe the inadvertent data leakage between processes on 
a monolithic system, then the term used for communication 
channels which leak information in violation of system or 
process restrictions [1]. 
Covert channels inject secret data in normal and 
authorized traffic in such a way that do not raise the 
attention of the outside listener besides concealing of data 
existence and identity of the communication parties. Covert 
channels can be divided into two subcategories: 1- storage 
covert channel 2- timing covert channel. Storage covert 
channels use flaws in the implementation of network 
protocols to hide their secret message [6]. On the other hand, 
timing channels are created by manipulating time samples in 
the communication system. Therefore, advanced timing 
channels emulate the overt channel behavior that leads to 
less detectability than storage channels, but they suffer from 
lack of capacity [1, 7]. 
However, covert channels often considered as a 
threat to network security. Indeed, their usage for creating 
secure communications have been discussed in recent years. 
Calhoun Jr et al. proposed a covert authentication technique 
which uses 802.11 rate switching as a covert channel for 
authentication messages [8]. Sawicki and Piotrowski 
discussed a covert channel to authenticate access points, this 
channel uses beacon frames and timestamp fields and takes 
advantage of the least significant bits of these fields [9]. A 
covert channel which represented by Xie and Zhao have 
been used for identity authentication by using the intervals 
between two consecutive packets to embed identity tag [2]. 
All of the aforementioned methods are timing covert 
channels. However, they can afford obscurity, but suffer 
from some drawbacks like the need of synchronization for 
the both sides and also a very limited capacity of data, just 
few bits in most cases. Therefore, for an efficient channel, 
we need to employ storage covert channels, which leverage 
network protocols as a carrier for transferring data. 
Protocols such as ICMP, IP, and TCP have been used for 
storage channels [10]. As an example, a storage covert 
channel proposed by Muchene et al. to report insider threats, 
which benefits of using the differences in the framing 
approaches used by Ethernet and IP packets to append 
hidden information within IP packets and transmits it to an 
organization administrator [11]. Layer 7 (Application) 
protocols such as HTTP and DNS are also commonly used.  
Being prevalence on the Internet is not the main factor to 
select these protocols, standard practices show they are 
allowed through network protection devices by default and 
it makes them a suitable protocol for designing covert 
channels [10]. 
Domain Name System (DNS) is a significant 
protocol and service on the internet which is commonly used 
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for mapping domain names into IP addresses. The ports are 
used for communication are UDP server port 53 and TCP 
server port 53. UDP is commonly used, but TCP will be 
used for zone transfers or with payloads over 512 bytes [12]. 
Generally, we have two common issues in designing 
covert channels, channel capacity and detectability. Since 
DNS is a prevalence, bidirectional, recursive protocol and it 
is necessary for running applications, it can be obscure as a 
covert channel. In addition, DNS covert channels can 
achieve a bandwidth of 110 kilobytes per second with 150 
ms of latency [13], which is an acceptable capacity for a 
storage channel. 
The key features of DNS make it a suitable protocol 
for creating covert channels. These channels can be used for 
a full remote control channel, capabilities including 
Operating System (OS) commands, file transfers, full IP 
tunnel or penetration testing tool [13, 14]. 
DNS covert channels can also come with DNS 
tunneling term. In DNS tunneling, another protocol is 
tunneled with DNS. Pearson first discussed DNS covert 
channels in 1998. All of them have similar basis, but they 
come with different encoding and implementation details. 
Main techniques include a controlled domain or subdomain, 
a server side entity, a client side entity and encoded data in 
DNS payloads. The server is the authoritative name server 
for the controlled domain and responds to client queries for 
this domain. The client is the other end of the channel, 
which needs to query the server to send and receive data. 
However, DNS channels have existed since 1998, tunneling 
data over DNS widely presented in 2004 with proposing 
OzymanDNS by Kaminsky. Different record types and 
encoding methods have been used by DNS covert channel, 
but TXT and NULL are the ones with most used [13, 14, 15]. 
NSTX tunnels IP over DNS by splitting the IP 
packets into several DNS packets besides using of TXT 
records [16]. OzymanDNS can transfer TCP or SSH over 
DNS and supports of EDNS0, this tool transfer data in TXT 
records [17]. The idea of DNScat was started by NSTX 
which tunnels IP over DNS, but they are dissimilar in design 
and implementation. It uses A and CNAME records and 
provide a bidirectional communication through DNS servers 
[18]. DNS2TCP transfers TCP or SSH over DNS in TXT 
records [19]. TUNS connects a client in a firewalled 
network with a server on the internet. It splits IP packets 
using IP fragmentation in operating system and transfer 
them in CNAME records [15]. Heyoka encodes data in the 
hostname of queries for transferring data from client and 
TXT, NULL records have been used in this method [20]. 
Iodine is a tool proposed by Andersson in 2010, which 
transfers IP over DNS in a set of queries like NULL, TXT, 
SRV, MX, CNAME and A records. It needs to use a virtual 
interface (TUN/TAP) to make the channel [21]. However, 
Iodine transfer data in plain text, DNScat2 developed more 
advanced method for data security such as encryption, 
authentication and signature to provide confidentiality and 
integrity for data [22]. Most of the discussed methods, 
tunnel another protocol in DNS packets. We can transfer 
different data through DNS packets like botnets such as 
feederbot [23], which uses DNS as a command and control 
protocol. 
In this paper we proposed a DNS covert channel to 
transfer data and meet requirements such as acceptable 
capacity and undetectablitiy in addition to compatibility 
with its network environment. Data in this channel is secure 
without imposing overhead by implying security methods. 
The rest of the paper organized as follows: in section 2, the 
proposed scheme for covert channel are discussed in more 
details. After that, experimental results and analysis of the 
proposed channel provided in section 3. Finally, in section 4, 
we come into conclusion. 
2. Proposed scheme 
The channel properties and the operation have been 
explained in this section. Sections 2.1 to 2.7 are about 
channel properties and data transmission is discussed in 
section 2.8. 
 
2.1. Data Encapsulation 
 
DNS works on UDP as a connectionless protocol 
with no guarantee for packet delivery. Packets need to be 
traced in case of packet lost. Therefore, we benefits of TCP 
principles in data encapsulation. The sequence numbers are 
used to track packets and prevent of retransmissions. In 
contrast to TCP, only one sequence number is used in both 
sides to save more space for data and make the channel 
simple. The structure is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
HMAC Message Sequence 
number 
ID  Flags 
Fig. 1. The packet structure in the proposed channel 
 
Flags: they are used for control purposes. Three bits 
are dedicated to flags, one bit per each flag. Flags are 
defined as below: 
 Data_type: Both of communication parties need to 
know the type of data in order to decide how to behave with 
it. The data type is distinguished into text and binary. Before 
data transmission, its type is checked and the Data_type flag 
will be set. The 0 value is for the binary data and 1 for the 
text data. 
 False integrity: it checks the integrity of data by 
checking the HMAC part. When the HMAC code of a 
packet is incorrect, the receiver of packet sets this flag to 1 
and sends another packet. The sequence number in this 
packet is supposed to be the same number as corrupted 
packet. When the sender receives such packet, it will notice 
there was a problem in the packet and resend it. 
 Fin: each side sets this flag to 1 while they have no 
data to send. 
ID: a one byte random number as the client 
identification. Each client will get a unique ID. 
Sequence Number: a two byte random number to 
represent the packets sequence. The client selects the initial 
sequence number (ISN) and the number is incremented one 
by one for each packet. 
Message: the data needs to be sent. It can be a file, 
string, etc. 
HMAC: the HMAC code is calculated to check the 
integrity of data and then attached to the end of the packet. 
 
2.2. Candidate Record Type Selection 
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The covert channel is supposed to work in a network, 
since this environment is constantly changing, the network 
condition needs to be analysed to adapt the channel activity 
with its working network. Thus, before the channel starts 
working, a real time process checks the network and DNS 
record types with more frequency in the current traffic will 
be selected. These record types are considered as candidate 
records and will be stored. Whenever the channel has data to 
transfer, one candidate record type will be selected 
randomly. This approach makes the channel obscure and 
adaptable with its network. 
 
2.3. Encoding Type 
 
In order to prevent raise of attention to the channel, 
queries need to look normal like standard DNS packets. 
Therefore, Base32 is used to encode queries from the client. 
Base32 encoding is designed to represent arbitrary 
sequences of octets in a form to be case insensitive, but not 
human readable [24]. Base32 or 5-bit encoding is commonly 
used for requests from the client [13] and also references 
such as DNScurve [25] and RFC5155 [26] use Base32 
encoding in queries for security purposes. Base32 utilization 
as an encoding method in one hand leads to lower capacity 
(5 bits per character), but on the other hand it makes the 
channel more adapted with normal traffics. DNS queries and 
responses pass through the ISP’s DNS infrastructure, they 
must not be too different with normal DNS packets. The 
responses in record types such as CNAME which have a 
similar response structure with requests also encode in 
Base32. In order to encode more data, Base64 or 6-bit 
encoding is used for TXT record responses. 
 
2.4. Variable Packet Length 
 
Some detection methods, like Guy, consider DNS 
queries and response length, which look at all hostname 
requests longer than 52 characters. DNS covert channels            
usually try to embed as much as possible data in requests 
and response, therefore, they will have long labels up to 63 
characters and long overall names up to 255 characters [13]. 
Based on RFC1034 [27], the hostname in DNS query 
is limited to 255 characters and it is structured in labels. 
Labels must be 63 characters or less. In this implementation, 
test.com is considered as the channel domain. For this 
domain, the hostname with maximum amount of data would 
be look like this: 
63chars.63chars.63chars.54chars.test.com 
In encoding with Base32, The maximum amount of 
data would be 1215 bits (151 bytes) per packet, definitely in 
Base64 this amount will be more. In order to provide more 
reliability and prevent of recognition by length based 
detection methods, we don’t embed data to the maximum 
amount. After encoding data in Base32, the volume of data 
decreases because of 5 bits per character, in order to not 
make large packets length and payload, a range with a 
maximum of 10 and a minimum of 2 bytes is considered. 
Whenever a query needs to be sent, a random number in 
range (2, 10) will be selected as the total amount of message, 
also the labels length will be changed randomly. This range 
can be modified based on the statistics in network evaluation 
phase as mentioned in section 2.2. It means, if most of the 
normal packets in the network are large, bigger numbers 
will be selected for the range, otherwise the range will have 
small numbers like this current implementation. 
This method works for upstream data (client to server) 
which the data is always encapsulated in the hostnames. It 
can also work for downstream data (server to client) with 
record types such as CNAME, which have a similar 
response structure with requests. For other record types in 
downstream like TXT, we can only change the total amount 
of encapsulated data. The header length of encapsulated data 
is invariable for all packets, but with altering the amount of 
message, the total length of packets will change and this 
approach prevents of having uniformed packets, which can 
be suspicious. 
 
2.5. A Lightweight Obfuscation Method to Obscure 
the Data Stream 
 
The data in channel needs to get defaced to prevent 
of leaking information even after the channel gets 
discovered. However,   Iodine [21] transfers data in plain 
text and Feederbot just uses a simple encryption method like 
RC4 [23], Dnscat2 benefits from some stronger encryption 
methods like salsa20. 
In the proposed channel, we just need to deface the 
data without imposing more overhead on the channel. 
Therefore the data get obfuscated not encrypted, which 
needs key exchange. It is assumed there is a pre-shared 
secret between communication parties. A pseudorandom 
number generator (PRNG) is used. PRNG seed is generated 
based on (1): 
 
𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 ⊕ 𝐼𝑆𝑁, 
                                   𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑)              (1) 
 
Where ISN is the initial sequence number has 
exchanged in the beginning of the connection establishment. 
ISN number is supposed to be unique for each client. 
Whenever a packet needs to be sent, Ri will be generated 
and i is the number of the generated packet. The data is get 
obfuscated based on (2). 
 
𝑂𝑏𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊕ 𝑅𝑖     (2) 
 
After obfuscation, the data will be encoded in Base32 
or Base64 and encapsulate in the packet. 
 
2.6. Integrity Check 
 
Feederbot uses a simple CRC32 code to check the 
data integrity and Dnscat2 signs the data. In the proposed 
channel, data integrity is provided by HMAC code. 
Hence we want to use HMAC only for integrity 
check and we rely on obfuscation for security purposes. 
MD5 is used as the hash function for HMAC. MD5 has the 
shorter output with 128 bits in comparing with SHA family, 
and shorter output gives us the opportunity to transfer more 
data per packet. The HMAC key generation is stated in (3). 
 
𝐾𝑒𝑦 = 𝑀𝐷5(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡||𝐼𝑆𝑁)                    (3) 
 
And the HMAC function works like (4): 
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𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶 = 𝑀𝐷5(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎||𝐼𝑆𝑁||𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡)   (4) 
 
The HMAC code is added after the encoded data as 
discussed in section 2.1. The data in HMAC part is the 
message before obfuscation and encoding, it doesn’t include 
header which has flags, ID and sequence number. The 
header needs to transfer in plain text for control purposes. 
When a packet is received, first the data is decoded and 
deobfuscated, then the message is obtained. The other party 
has to generate the HMAC code and compares it with the 
received code, if they are equal it means the data has 
transferred properly. Otherwise the false integrity flag will 
be set to 1 and a packet will be sent with the same sequence 
number and an arbitrary string in the message section. When 
the sender of packet receives a packet with the same 
sequence number as its previous packet has just sent, it will 
notice there was a problem in that packet and resend it. 
 
2.7. Packet Loss and Reordering 
 
For being undetectable, DNS queries in the proposed 
channel pass through the pre-configured DNS resolver on 
the host and unlike Feederbot, the channel does not query 
the server directly. Bypassing the pre-configured DNS 
resolver can be suspicious. Therefore the pre-configured 
DNS server on the host is responsible for receiving the 
replies and our DNS queries will behaved like other queries 
in the host. In the server side, since there is one ID per client, 
until the server doesn’t receive a DNS query from the client 
with Fin flag 1, receiving packets will continue, and the 
server keeps the connection open. The client can encounter 
with a problem and the server doesn’t receive any query 
from the client for a long time, the server needs to terminate 
the connection one sided. 
For this approach, a time interval is set based on 
normal TTL values for DNS records. If this interval is 
expired and the server had not received any packet from the 
client, the server terminates the connection and the client ID 
will be removed from the server side. If the client connects 
the server after this time expiration, the server considers this 
connection as a new one. 
As sequence numbers are utilized in the channel, 
both sides have to discard packets which have an equal or 
smaller sequence number with the last packet they received, 
for server this is done per each ID. There is an exception has 
explained in section 2.6 that packets with the same sequence 
number won’t be discarded. 
 
2.8. The Communication Phases 
 
This section is about the phases in which client and 
server as two sides of covert channel start a communication, 
transfer the data and terminate the connection after they 
finish sending data. 
2.8.1 Connection Establishment:  The proposed channel 
works on DNS, the client needs to start the communication 
and the server responses to the client request. First the client 
generates one byte random number as its ID and a two bytes 
random number as initial sequence number (ISN). 
Encapsulated data will be structured as explained in section 
2.1.   
 
2.8.2 Data Transmission from Client Side:  Data transfer 
from the client side will be done in the following steps: 
 
1. Before sending data, its data type will be checked 
and the Data_type flag will be set to an appropriate 
value. 
2. The amount of message which needs to transfer is 
selected randomly in the given range as described 
in section 2.4 
3. The message gets obfuscated and encoded with the 
header part based on the method discussed in 
section 2.5 and the HMAC code is added as 
explained in section 2.6. 
4. The record type is selected randomly among of 
candidate record types as described in section 2.2. 
5. Data from the client is always transferred as a 
request, therefore we need to embed the data in the 
hostname for example: data_from_client.test.com. 
   
If there is no data left for sending but the server still 
have data, the client sets its Fin flag to 1 and it indicates the 
client finished sending data. Then a random string is 
generated and encapsulated in the message part. The random 
string with flags, ID and sequence number follow steps like 
data packets. Then, it will be encapsulated in the hostname 
of the query. The proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
2.8.3 Data Transmission from Server Side: When a 
request in defined domain (for example: test.com) receives, 
first the server decodes and deobfuscates the data as (5), (6): 
 
𝑂𝑏𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒32. 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)(5) 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑑), 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝑂𝑏𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ⊕ 𝑅𝑖 (6) 
If the server has data to send, it follows the steps 1 to 
3 as described above in section 2.8.2. Data from the server is 
embedded in rdata part of the response. In case of no data to 
send, since response to a DNS request is compulsory, 
whether there is data in the client side or not, the value of 
Fin flag is set to 1 to demonstrate the server has no data to 
send. Then a random string is generated and placed in the 
message part. The random string with flags and ID and 
sequence number follow the steps like data packets, then 
encapsulated in rdata part of the response and will be sent. 
The proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 3. Steps in Fig.3 are 
the same ones in Fig. 2. 
 
2.8.4 Connection Termination: When each part of the 
communication finish sending data, they set the fin flag 
value to 1, besides a random string will be located in the 
message part and encapsulate with flags, ID and sequence 
number in a packet. Data receiving will continue until 
completion of data transfer by the other side, which will be 
determined by setting the fin flag to 1. When one side is 
about to terminate the connection, it needs to check whether 
the other side has declared finishing data or not. While the 
fin flag has set to 1 in both sides, each of parties can 
terminate the connection. 
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Fig. 2. Data transmission from the client side 
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Fig. 3. Data transmission from the server side
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3. Evaluation and results 
The proposed channel is implemented in python 
programing language. The candidate record types are A, 
CNAME and TXT in this implementation. In order to check 
its adaptability with normal traffics, the proposed channel 
statistics were compared with two datasets of normal 
network traffic. 
Dataset A: a normal capture of traffic in a home 
network. Capture duration is 1.9 hours and the number of 
packets is 5966. The performed actions are included: - 
Music streaming from 20songstogo.com - Gmail - Twiter - 
Jitsi chat connected to gtalk, SIP and CVUT jabber. - Some 
ssh - cacti web - normal webs with chrome. The capture has 
done in 2015-03-24. 
Dataset B: a normal capture in a Linux Debian 
notebook computer in an xDSL network. Capture duration is 
1281.885508 seconds (21 minutes). Applications and 
actions in the normal computer are: Deluge P2P on linux 
notebook. Downloading some large files. The p2p was 
running for 1 hour when the capture was started. At the 
beginning there is also an mtr sending icmp packages to 
www.google.com .Some web pages were accessed: twitter, 
facebook, etc. All using the Chrome browser. The capture 
has done in 2013-12-17. 
In addition to these datasets, we compared the 
proposed channel with Dnscat2. Since other previous DNS 
channels as named in the introduction section are not new or 
have different purposes, we compare our channel with 
Dnscat2 as the latest one. Dnscat2 includes many options, 
since the proposed channel is designed only for data transfer, 
data transferring in Dnscat2 has been compared. 
Files with different random sizes were used as the 
message, then they were transferred by both of the proposed 
channel and Dnscat2. Tests had been done in a local 
network with two virtual machines as client and server. The 
operating system is Kali-Linux-2016.1 in the server and 
Ubuntu-14.04.2 in the client. 
 
3.1. Length and Size 
 
Table 1 provides the statistics for Datasets A and B 
that gained by Wireshark. The proposed channel was 
evaluated in payload size, qname length and packet length 
with Datasets A, B as normal DNS traffics to check the 
similarity with normal traffics. Also the channel is compared 
with Dnscat2. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the statistics for 12 times 
running proposed channel and Dnscat2 with different file 
sizes as exchanged data. Results show the minimum value 
for payload size, qname length and packet length are 
constant in Dnscat2, while in proposed channel, both 
minimum and maximum values are variable as defined in 
section 2.4. The Average value of payload size in the 
proposed channel and Dnscat2 are 68.28 and 94.78, 
respectively. It is noticeable that values of proposed channel 
are more compatible with average values in Dataset A with 
71.65 and Dataset B with 70.62 rather than Dnscat2. The 
Average value of packet length in the proposed channel is 
110.28 and for Dnscat2 is 136.78. This results prove that our 
channel is more adaptable with Datasets A and B than 
Dnscat2 in the similar circumstance. Average qname length 
is 37.71 in the proposed channel and 50.93 in Dnscat2. This 
value is 19.94 and 27.48 for Dataset A and Dataset B 
respectively. However, qname lengths in the proposed 
channel is shorter than Dnscat2 qname lengths, still there is 
a difference with normal traffics. Base32 is used in encoding 
records, which cause longer lengths, but this doesn’t make 
the queries abnormal. Also the maximum qname length in 
our proposed method is 46 and 47, and the maximum values 
for Datasets as normal DNS traffic are 44 and 36. Therefore, 
the proposed channel qname length is adaptable with 
maximum values of normal traffics and this difference 
won’t be noticeable in huge amount of DNS traffics which 
are transferring daily. 
 
3.2.  Standard Looking Queries 
 
As Table 4 shows most of queries in normal traffics 
fall into 4th level or 3rd level. In the proposed channel all of 
the queries fall into 4th level, but in Dnscat2 the majority 
are in 3rd level. This result indicates that queries in the 
proposed channel do not differ with normal queries and 
follow the normal standards. 
Table 4 Label statistics for queries in datasets A and B 
Dataset 4th Level 
or More 
3rd Level 2nd 
Level  
1st Level 
     
A 253 2575 197 4 
B 1007 60 7 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Statistics for datasets A and B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dataset Packet 
count 
Payload size Qname len Packet len 
min max avg min max avg min max avg 
A 5966 22 377 71.65 6 44 19.94 64 419 113.56 
B 2147 27 262 70.62 11 36 27.48 69 304 112.62 
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Table 2 The statistics for proposed channel and Dnscat2 in transferring 12 different data sizes 
 
Total 
transferred 
bytes 
Payload size Qname length 
  
Proposed channel Dnscat2 Proposed channel Dnscat2 
min max avg min max avg min max avg min max avg 
12 53 95 67.17 61 346 93.28 37 38 37.33 45 159 48.75 
19 53 107 72.63 61 346 89.78 37 46 39.75 45 159 46.14 
23 53 105 70.20 61 183 90.27 37 40 37.80 45 108 47.03 
30 50 102 67.83 61 197 95.36 34 37 36 45 122 50.50 
41 48 107 69 61 218 92.66 32 39 37.38 45 145 49 
52 46 107 69.33 61 242 93.02 30 46 37.11 45 167 48.94 
69 50 103 68.50 61 265 93.06 34 47 38.07 45 202 49.62 
76 44 97 66.36 61 279 93.77 28 40 36.36 45 216 50.18 
87 46 110 67.56 61 313 94.67 30 46 37.06 45 238 51.66 
93 46 96 64.84 61 313 100.42 30 46 36.94 45 240 56.39 
100 50 103 69.80 61 315 103.90 34 46 40.60 45 240 59.60 
112 46 103 66.11 61 313 97.21 30 46 38.11 45 240 53.41 
Table 3 Packet length for proposed channel and Dnscat2 in transferring 12 different data sizes 
Total 
transferred 
bytes 
Proposed channel 
 
DNScat2 
min max avg min max avg 
12 95 137 109.17 103 388 135.28 
19 95 149 114.63 103 388 131.78 
23 95 147 112.20 103 225 132.27 
30 92 144 109.83 103 239 137.36 
41 90 149 111.00 103 260 134.66 
52 88 149 111.33 103 284 135.02 
69 92 145 110.50 103 307 135.06 
76 86 139 108.36 103 321 135.77 
87 88 152 109.56 103 355 136.67 
93 88 138 106.84 103 355 142.42 
100 92 145 111.80 103 357 145.90 
112 88 145 108.11 103 355 139.21 
 
 
3.3. Security Consideration 
 
HMAC code is applied to check the integrity of data, 
so data corruption would be detectable in exchange. The 
channel can meet data integrity besides error detection by 
HMAC code utilization. The data obfuscation is implied not 
only to deface the data, but also to make it unreadable by an 
intruder, which satisfies confidentiality properties. In order 
to not impose a more overhead on the channel, any kind of 
encryption and authentication schemes are not used in the 
proposed scheme. Instead, a pre-shared value is used as the 
secret parameter to build a shared key between the 
communication parties.   
 
3.4. Channel Capacity 
 
Table 5 displays the amount of data as the number of 
packets which are needed to complete data transfer. In order 
to meet adaptability and prevent of making abnormal traffic, 
the encapsulated data in a single packet is not high, however 
this option can be changeable due to channel environment as 
explained in section 2.4. For this implementation and with 
these current parameters, the average capacity of channel 
would be 2.65 bytes of data per packet. The only overhead 
in data encapsulation is because of double issues. First, the 
header needs to repeat in every packet and the second is the 
encoding type as discussed in section 2.3. 
Previous channels such as Dnscat2, keep their 
session alive with constantly pulling the server, in result 
they inject many DNS packets in network traffic. In our 
examination, 72 packets were exchanged in 30 seconds 
running Dnscat2.  This issue can make anomaly and 
overhead in the network even for transferring a low amount 
of data. In contrast, the client in the proposed channel 
doesn’t have to pull the server for keeping the connection 
alive, because the channel is implied for data transmission 
and the connection will be terminated after it. 
The proposed channel capacity is acceptable since 
there is no extra packets as pulling ones and the packets just 
transfer data without imposing overhead on the network.  
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Furthermore, some confidential data such as secret keys are 
not big, they can be transferred with the proposed channel 
that provides them obscurity while exchange. 
 
Table 5 Channel capacity 
Total transferred 
bytes 
Packet count Bytes per packet 
12 6 2 
19 8 2.37 
23 10 2.3 
30 12 2.5 
41 16 2.56 
52 18 2.88 
69 28 2.46 
76 28 2.71 
87 32 2.71 
93 32 2.90 
100 30 3.33 
112 36 3.1 
 
 
3.5. Detectability 
 
For evaluating channel detectability, the proposed 
channel was tested with Opnsense 17.1 as an open source 
SPI firewall and Suricata 3.2.1 as an open source IDS. 
Suricata rules have been updated to the date of 2017-09-28. 
Two test scenarios were designed, one with Opnsense and 
another for Suricata. 
As the client and server are running in virtual 
machines, Opnsense firewall was installed on another virtual 
machine and set as a gateway between the client and the 
server. All traffics from the client to the server and reverse 
pass through the firewall. The firewall was configured to 
monitor both incoming and outgoing traffics. After running 
Opnsense, the channel started running and transferring files. 
The firewall didn’t record anything suspicious about the 
channel. 
In the next scenario, the channel detectability had 
been tested by an IDS and in our case Suricata was used. 
Since in DNS covert channels scenarios is assumed the 
server is under control and the client is the machine which is 
not in control, so the IDS was installed on the client side to 
check channel detectability by IDS updated rules. Similar to 
the previous scenario, after running Suricata, the channel 
started working and transferring files. To make an accurate 
estimate, the tests were repeated for varied data sizes as files. 
The IDS didn’t record any suspicious activity. 
 
3.6. RFC Compliant 
 
In this section, the proposed channel is evaluated 
with the following items to show the channel compatibility 
with standards in RFCs. 
3.6.1 Queries and Responses Size: The 
proposed covert channel doesn’t proceed the limited size as 
mentioned in RFCs. While most of covert channels try to 
put as much as data in the packets, the proposed channel 
tries to make a good balance between undetectability and 
capacity. 
3.6.2 Common Record Types: There is an 
evaluation phase before the channel starts working and this 
leads to selecting common records in current traffic. This 
approach prevents of selecting uncommon records that 
makes the channel detectable. 
3.6.3  Encoding Type: The encoding methods 
were selected for encoding queries and responses are RFC 
compliant and commonly used. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We proposed a covert channel based on DNS 
protocol for covert data transmission. The channel can get 
adaptable with its network environment and works stealthy. 
The channel works with common DNS record types, 
encoding, and it is RFC compliant. A lightweight 
obfuscation method has implied for data encapsulation 
without imposing overhead on the channel. This method is 
more lightweight in comparison with Dnscat2, which needs 
key exchange and encryption. Data integrity in the channel 
has been provided by HMAC. Experimental results show the 
channel has a good compatibility with normal traffics. The 
evaluation with two security software, Opnsesne as an SPI 
firewall and Suricata as an open source IDS with latest 
updated rules, didn’t record anything suspicious. The 
channel capacity is an average 2.65 bytes of data per packet, 
which is acceptable because of the encoding type and 
undetectablility. We can also improve the capacity by 
adding another phase to evaluate the packet sizes of the 
network and set the channel parameters based on them. This 
option can lead to a higher capacity without drawing 
attention. The channel presented in this paper has a good 
capability for transferring confidential data such as key 
exchange, user credentials and other secret information. 
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